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Abstract: This paper investigates the linkage between emerging urban spatial development 
and institutional arrangements in China. Emerging spatial patterns, which are prevalent and 
sizable so that any impacts will be substantial, include dispersed employment concentration, 
fragmented  land  development,  over-scaled  land  development,  leapfrogging  development, 
and whack-a-mole development. From the institutional  point of view, these patterns are 
associated with decentralization, fiscal incentives for local government, land regulations, and 
fragmented planning system. It is concluded that these emerging spatial patterns significantly 
affect long term city sustainable growth and comprehensive reforms are needed to promote 
efficient urban spatial forms. It is further concluded that labor division between planning and 
markets  should  be  reshaped  in  determining  urban spatial growth by shifting planning to 
focus  on  zoning  that  provides  sufficient  development  room  in  a  long  term  and  making 
markets to decide the timing of land development. 
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1. Introduction  
Urban  form  and  spatial  structure  are  of  interest  to  economists,  urban  planners,  transportation 
engineers, environmentalists, and geographers since they are directly and indirectly associated with land 
and capital allocations and utilizations, urban agglomerative economy, transportation demand, energy 
usage,  environmental  impact,  and  many  other  urban  issues  and  problems  such  as  traffic  
congestion [1-3]. Efficient utilization of land resources requires changes in the intensity of land use with 
OPEN ACCESS Sustainability 2009, 1                      
 
 
385 
respect to land prices while a certain degree of substitution of land to capital is needed to ensure optimal 
inputs of land and structure for profit maximization in housing production [4-7].  
An efficient spatial structure facilitates labor pooling, reducing average manufacturing costs, and 
promotes  spillovers  in  technology  and  management.  Clustering  employment  and  non-residential 
activities increases the average travel distance and time and are constructive in the creation, transfer and 
usage of knowledge [8-10]. The size and level of concentration of population and workers increases the 
chance  for  face-to-face  contact,  which  ―is  an  efficient  communication  technology,  can  help  solve 
incentive  problems,  can  facilitate  socialization  and  learning,  and  provides  psychological  
motivation‖ [11]. Through face-to-face contact facilitation, clustering of firms and workers increases 
localized interactions that promote technological innovation. Face-to-face contact also plays important 
roles in business development and social networking. Therefore, cities are hubs for innovation in the 
production of ideas and knowledge and in their commercialization [12].  
An efficient urban spatial form is cost effective in infrastructure provision through coordination with 
land uses (such as land use and transportation integration). It can also enhance local governments’ fiscal 
and finance efficiency, which can be improved by arranging urban spatial patterns in ways in which 
preferences for the public good are homogenous, free-riders for public goods are reduced or eliminated, 
and private benefits and public costs of public goods and services are equalized [13,14].  
An efficient urban spatial form has minimum land use externality via a separation of incompatible 
land  uses  [14-17].  Finally,  an  efficient  spatial  structure  increases  quality  of  life  and  promotes 
preservation  of  open  space,  farmland,  and  urban  environment,  which  helps  to  increase  a  city’s 
competitiveness and attractiveness. In a sum, an efficient urban spatial pattern can accommodate urban 
growth while concurrently reducing or minimizing unwanted consequences.  
Urban spatial structure is constantly evolving, reflecting accumulated decisions on land improvement, 
economic development, provision of urban infrastructure, institutional arrangements on fiscal and tax 
policy, as well as planning regulations. Urban spatial structure is thus a physical outcome of regulation, 
taxation, planning, and land markets upon the terrain constraints and topography of a city [18]. The 
complexity of urban areas and marginal changes of built areas are perhaps two primary reasons for the 
under documentation in the literature in linking city landscape to urban policy.  
Both the speed and scale of urban development in Chinese cities, particularly along the eastern coast, 
have been taking place at an unprecedented pace and scale. The rapid urban spatial encroachment into 
rural areas has been driven by enormous economic growth for business development and by a strong 
individual  desire  for  a  better  quality  of  life  (measured  by  housing  consumption,  infrastructure 
improvement,  increased  transportation  accessibility,  and  the  building  and  preserving of urban green 
space) [19-21]. The remarkable urban spatial developments in Chinese cities do not occur without great 
costs and unwanted consequences, reflected in environmental deterioration, open space destruction, 
rising urban-rural tension, increased transportation expenses, chaotic urban spatial encroachment and 
sprawl. This paper will then focus on two fundamental questions: 1) during the rapid transition period, 
what are the emerging urban spatial development patterns that have substantial long term efficiency or 
cost  implications  and  affect  sustainable  growth  trajectories  that  reduce  a  city’s  productivity  and 
competitiveness;  2)  are  there  any  policies  directly  or  indirectly  responsible  for  the  creation  and Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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development of these inefficient urban spatial patterns? In other words, what are institutional factors 
behind the emerging inefficient urban development patterns?  
Urban spatial structures are complex, path-dependent, resilient, and slow to change. It is difficult, if 
not  impossible,  to  analyze  them,  particularly  with  respect  to  policy  changes.  Rapid  urban  spatial 
expansion and dramatic changes in institutions governing resource mobility in China throughout the past 
three  decades  may  provide  a  rare  opportunity  to  investigate  the  interaction  between  urban  spatial 
developments and policies. Dramatic movement towards a market economy from a planned one has 
greatly changed incentives of economic agents and increased mobility of labor, capital and land inputs.  
Systematic and quantitative analyses of urban spatial structure and their association with policy and 
institutional changes require extensive data at both the micro- and macro-levels for measurement as well 
as in time series for possible causality examination. This kind of data, however, rarely exists. This paper 
hence  takes  a  different  approach  to  speculate  about  the  possible  connection  between  urban  spatial 
development and policy and institutional settings. Instead of cross-section data examination or case 
studies  on  typical  regions/areas,  this  paper  analyzes  urban  spatial  development  patterns  that  are 
representative  and  widespread  in  many  Chinese  cities  based  on  reasoning  rational  behaviors  of 
players/agents  and  incentive  structures  behind  land  development.  Sound  investigation  of  causality 
between urban spatial development and policy and institutional arrangement is not a primary objective 
for this paper. Rather, this paper attempts to shed insight onto connections and interactions.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses land use and development in the 
pre-reform  period,  followed  by  the  examination  of  land  development  in  the  post-reform  period.  
Section 4 focuses on emerging urban spatial forms while Section 5 reasons factors behind inefficient 
urban spatial patterns. Section 6 concludes the paper with a few final remarks.  
2. Land Use and Development in the Pre-Reform Period  
Both urban spatial development and the institutional arrangements for land use and development 
should be examined in a historical context because of resiliency and path-dependency of city shape. In 
the pre-reform period, the spatial structure of Chinese cities looked similar and had distinctive features 
of ―uniform and standardized landscapes of mixed industrial and residential compounds‖ [22, p. 30]. 
These compounds, which were often separated from others via walls, served multiple functions such as 
workplaces, residential space, playgrounds, and social services such as kindergartens and shops. Those 
highly mixed land use compounds suited prevailing transportation modes (pedestrian and bicycles) well 
and became one of the dominant urban patterns in China. The widespread distribution of those mixed 
land  use  compounds  in  the  city  produced  the  so-called  cellular  urban  fabric  structure,  which  was 
integrated at a micro-level but became chaotic at a macro-level.  
Highly  mixed  land  use  patterns  have  two  spatial  implications.  One  is  associated  with  the  flat 
employment  density  curve.  Unlike  monocentric  cities  with  steep  employment  density  curves  (jobs, 
particularly non-manufacturing jobs, tend to concentrate in central locations), mixed land use patterns 
spread jobs out over a city and createed flat employment distribution and density curves in Chinese 
cities  [23].  In  contrast,  westernized  cities  (i.e.,  New  York,  Tokyo,  Seoul,  Washington  DC,  and 
Chicago) have steep employment density curves, largely attributable to the presence of their Central 
Business Districts (CBDs). New York and San Francisco, for instance, have 45-50 percent of its total Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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employment rate located within a 3 mile ring around their CBD respectively. The average employment 
density within 0–5 mile from the CBD, for instance, is 24,000 persons per square mile, which is much 
higher than average population density of 7,700 person per square mile across American cities.  
The other implication is related to spatial traffic patterns. Highly mixed land use patterns generate 
traffic flows that point to all directions in the two dimensional space. Traffic jams resulting from chaotic 
and  unorganized  traffic  spatial  flows  slow  down  traffic  and  create  mental  stress  for  drivers.  
Co-existence of multi-modes (walking, bicycling, automobiles, and buses) further substantially amplifies 
traffic jams (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Traffic jam in Beijing. 
(Source: http://szb.northnews.cn/nmgrb/html/2008-07/10/content_107445.htm) 
Many residential lots are found in the middle of farm fields, creating a very fragmented land use 
patterns in China rural areas (Figure 2). Like many other agrarian countries, intermingling of farmland 
and  residential  lots  are  due  to  low  scale  operation  in  agricultural  economy  and  non-motorcycle 
dominance of transportation. What makes land use patterns in China’s rural areas more distinctive, 
however, is the degree to which residential lots and farmland are intermingled together, largely resulting 
from low capita cultivated land occupation, particularly in eastern coastal areas. Per capital cultivated 
land  occupation  in  Zhejiang  and  Jiangsu  provinces,  for  instance,  were  0.54  mu  and  1.03  mu, 
respectively, in 2000 (mu is area unit of 1/15 hectare). Since both provinces have high urbanization 
rates, actual cultivated land occupation per peasant is around 1.5–3 mu. I think there are few other 
places that are more fragmented than in eastern coastal China (Figure 2).  
3. Land Development in Post-Reform Era 
Rapid industrialization and economic growth have caused Chinese cities to grow at unprecedented 
rates. The number of cities, sizes, and built-up areas has increased remarkably [20]. The built-up areas 
for  cities  and  towns  increased  from  7,438  square  kilometer  in  1981  to  25,927.6  square  kilometer  
in 2002. Not all cities and towns have grown proportionally. Larger and more developed cities expand 
more  quickly.  The  share  of  built-up  areas  by  prefecture  cities  over  total  built-up  areas  increased  
from 68.56 percent in 1998 to 76.4 percent in 2002, for example.  Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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Figure 2. Residential development in the rural Yangtze Delta. 
 
 
Remarkable urban spatial expansion is both a cause and effect of rapid economic growth [24,25]. 
This is particularly true for big cities (here big cities are defined by administrative status, for instance, 
prefecture vs. county cities rather than by population size). The share of GDP produced by prefecture 
cities over total national GDP rose from 36 percent in 1990 to 63 percent in 2007. The secondary 
industry’s GDP produced by prefecture cities was 259.4 billion and accounted for 47 percent of total 
GDP in that sector. These numbers increased to $946.1 billion and 65.07 percent in 2006, respectively. 
The  development  of  the  secondary  industry  is  attributed  largely  to  various  industrial  parks  and 
economic development districts that greatly benefit from tax incentives and special financial treatment. 
By  2004,  there  were  6,866  industrial  parks  and  economic  zones  on  land  covering  34,800  square 
kilometers, which exceeded total urban built-up areas. Many of these parks or districts are home to 
rapidly surging FDI and other fixed capital investments.  
Massive fixed capital investments, particularly in real estate and housing industries, are one of main 
engineers for pronounced land development. The real estate investments in housing development by 
developers grew from nothing to $111.2 in 2007 (total real estate investments in housing development 
exclude  investments  by  individuals).  Accordingly,  the  completed  building  construction  increased  
from  14.79  million  square  meters  in  1981  to  48.82  million.  Massive  investments  in  housing  have 
resulted in much improved housing conditions. The per capita housing consumption in cities and towns 
increased from 6.7 square meters in 1978 to 28 square meters in 2007.  
The magnitude of land development in China is manifested in the growth of amount of land leased to 
developers through the so-called land use rights system. There were only 15.7 ha of leased land in its Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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initial year of 1987, but the total amount of leased land increased to 0.415 million hectares, generating 
leasing revenues of nearly $160 billion in 2003. Land revenues, which were extra-budgetary incomes for 
sub-national  governments  until  2007  and  accounted  for  20–40  percent  for  total  government 
expenditures, were primarily used to finance infrastructure for urban expansions and services [26].  
4. Emerging Urban Spatial Patterns in Post-Reform Era 
Enormous urban spatial expansion did not take place without huge potential costs in terms of optimal 
urban form and city shape. This section focuses on emerging land use development patterns and their 
primary assessments.  
4.1. Dispersed Employment Concentrations 
The growth of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) has been a key in the successful advancement of the 
Chinese economy. SEZs take various forms such as: 1) high-tech industrial parks; 2) economic and 
technological development districts; 3) free-trade zones; 4) export-process zones; and 5) others, such as 
science-based industrial parks. Rapid growth in international trade and surging FDI, along with other 
fixed capital investments makes these zones and parks (at least some of them) vital to the performance 
of  the  national  economy.  Streamlined  government  administration  and  financial  and  tax  incentives 
encourage businesses and investments.  
Each SEZ is a large-scale land development project and home to hundreds of thousands of jobs. A 
survey  of  54  national  SEZs  in  2005  revealed  that  the  average  employment  density  was  slightly  
over 7,000 jobs per square kilometer (one should be cautious when interpreting the employment density 
in SEZs for three reasons: 1) many zones are in the process of development; 2) 30–35 percent of land is 
mandated for green and open space; and 3) an underreporting of employment number because of high 
rate of turnaround and short job tenure for floating population and temporary workers). Some zones, 
like the Hongqian development zone in Shanghai, have an employment density of more than 20,000 jobs 
per  square  kilometer.  The  Shenzhen  development  zone  in  2005  provided  more  than  422,500 
employment opportunities in land of 70 square kilometers.  
SEZs are developed at the urban fringe areas in a dispersed way, creating many satellite type towns, 
even in small or medium sized cities. For instance, Langfang located between Beijing and Tianjin is a 
city  of  slightly  over  4  million  on  a territory of 6,429 square kilometers (the urban population was 
around 400,000 in its central built-up areas). Its administrative areas include the city proper and eight 
districts and each of them has one provincial level SEZ. The city proper has two spatially separated 
SEZs: one is Langfang SEZ and other is Longhe SEZ. In 2005, more than 5,000 hectares of land 
development in these SEZs were completed and they contributed 35.1 percent and 45.5 percent to total 
GDP and fiscal revenues, respectively. Economic success has driven SEZs to expand their land to 208.6 
square kilometers.  
This kind of dispersed SEZs is common across Chinese cities. Kunshan, located between Shanghai 
and Suzhou, is one such medium-sized city with a population of 600,000 with Kunshan Hukou in 2007. 
Figure 3 illustrates that twelve SEZs spread over the entire 921 square kilometers of Kunshan territory 
provide  jobs  for  a  floating  population  of  1.4  million  that  worked  as  nongmingong  (so-called  rural 
migrant workers) in 2007. Lack of skills, nongmingong most often end up with low paid jobs and their Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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shelter needs are accommodated through workplace housing, rental housing, or enclaves around their 
workplaces [27]. Each SEZ thus emerges as spatial development node or nucleus in which jobs and 
housing are balanced but there is little integration of labor markets in the city. The dispersal of SEZs 
decreases labor mobility and negatively affects agglomeration economies in production, labor pooling, 
and spillover effects.  
There  is  little  dispute  about  the  importance  and  contribution  of  industrial  parks  and  zones  to 
economic  growth,  particularly  for  manufacturing.  There  are,  however,  disputes  about  the  spatial 
arrangements of these parks and zones. The issue of concern is associated with dispersed distribution of 
these parks and zones within a city, which creates many spatially separated employment sub-centers. 
This  dispersed  SEZs  development  inevitably  reduces  employment  concentration  and  will  negatively 
affect urban agglomeration effects.  
Dispersed employment development reduces employment density that is positively corrected with 
urban agglomeration effects. Empirical studies suggest that urban density is an important determinant of 
increasing economic returns to scale which facilitates the growth of a city due to positive feedback. A 
study by Ciccone and Hall [28] provides empirical evidence on the connection between urban density 
and labor productivity. They conclude that doubling of employment density in a county will increase 
average  labor  productivity  by  six  percent.  Furthermore,  empirical  studies  also  find  that  the 
concentration of employment is correlated with high employment opportunity and that there is strong 
association  between  industrial  concentration  and  industrial  outputs  [29].  A  study  by  Sedgley  and 
Elmslie [30] found that population density has a positive and significant relationship with the extent  
of innovation.  
Dispersed  development  of  SEZs  may  also  have  substantial  implications  for  housing-job  balance, 
particularly  for  low-income  rural-urban  migrants  [31,32].  Workplace  housing  provides  temporary 
solutions for nongmingong but alternative housing options should be sought to better serve the needs of 
the enormous number of rural-urban migrants projected during rapid urbanization and industrialization 
in the future. Job accessibility, urban service provision, and affordable housing for these low-income 
individuals  and  households  will  be  among  the  top  issues  that  would  be  better  addressed  in  large, 
comprehensive  and  heterogeneous  job  markets  such  as  in  metropolitan  areas  rather  than  in  
satellite towns.  
Finally, the impact of dispersed SEZs on urban transportation should not be overlooked. Although 
both theory and empirical studies provide mixed results with regard to the connection between urban 
transport demand and job decentralization [33-35], dispersed employment concentration may not likely 
help to reduce travel time and distance in China. This is partly because two-income households account 
for a large percentage of total households in Chinese cities and partly because of both low job mobility 
and low residential mobility [36-38]. It should be noticed that although urban transaction costs such as 
congestion increases with urban agglomeration, the continuous growth of many large metropolitan areas 
(such as New York and Tokyo) suggests that positive impacts of urban agglomeration exceed negative 
consequences [5]. Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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Figure 3. Land use (left) and locations of various zones (right) in Kunshan city. 
 
 
Note:  
A: Kunshan economic and technology development district;   B: Wujiang Industrial Park  
C: Zhouzhuang Science Park;     D: Export Industrial Zone (A and B) 
E: Chengbei High Tech Park;     F: Enterprise Development Zone for Overseas Scholars 
G: Huaqiao International Commercial District;    
H: Northern Industrial Zone;    I: University Park  
J: Bacheng Software Park;     K: Huayang Industrial Park  
M: Jingban Industrial Park 
4.2. Fragmented CBD Development  
A CBD is distinguished by high employment concentration, commercial and retail oriented activities, 
skyscrapers, and high traffic congestion. In 2001, the employment density in New York’s Manhattan 
was more than 238,000 jobs per square kilometer, while Tokyo’s three inner wards are treated as one of 
its  CBDs  in  which  2,434,200  jobs  are  offered  on  an  area  of  42.2  square  kilometers,  
yielding  an  average  employment  density  of  57,683  jobs  per  square  kilometer  (source: 
http://www.demographia.com/db-intlcbddensa.htm).  
Another striking physical feature that makes a CBD stand out in the city landscape is the clustering 
of commercial skyscrapers. The average FAR in the core of Seoul CBD is over 10 while the rest of the 
CBD and sub-centers have a FAR of 8. Land development for residential uses, has FAR values ranging 
between  0.5  and  4,  much  lower  than  those  in  Seoul  CBD  and  other  sub-centers.  The  FAR  in 
Singapore’s  CBD  ranges  from  8–25,  much  higher  than  residential  FAR  that  ranges  from  1.5–4 
(residential FAR close to the CBD may be up to 6). New York’s Middle Town has 14.63 FAR, on Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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average. The striking contrast between the CBD’s commercial development and other predominantly 
residential  uses  is  similar  in  many  other  cities.  Both  physical  profile  and  FAR  values  suggest  that 
commercial  buildings  in  CBDs  have  much  higher  values  of  FAR  than  that  of  residential structures 
outside the CBDs. Land use efficiency would be achieved if high-value added activities occupy central 
location where land prices are much higher than adjacent areas.  
This  leads  to  the  determination  of  what  land  uses  belong  to  CBD  and  what  land  uses  do  not. 
According to Murphy [39], non-CBD land uses include: 1) permanent residences (including apartment 
buildings and rooming houses); 2) government and public property (including parks and public schools 
as  well  as  establishments  carrying  out  administrative  functions);  3)  organization  establishments 
(churches,  colleges  etc.);  4)  industrial  establishments  (except  newspapers);  5)  wholesaling  and 
commercial storage; 6) railroads and switching yards, and 7) vacant buildings and lots. According to 
both urban theory as well as Murphy, the presence of these types of land uses in CBDs would certainly 
reduce land use efficiency.  
CBDs are also characterized by high building density. The mid-town CBD in New York’s Manhattan, 
for instance, has 36 lots on an area of 35.26 hectares. The average building density is 85.89 percent (the 
maximum value is 100 percent while the minimum value is 63 percent).  
Since 1990s, many large cities (with populations exceeding 1 million) in China began to construct 
new CBDs. By 2002, 36 cities (such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhengzhou, etc.) had 
planned or established a new CBD. As the economy continues to grow and living standards rise, non-
manufacturing jobs become increasingly important. Therefore, building CBDs for non-manufacturing 
jobs  such  as  commercial,  retail,  service  (e.g.,  finance  and  banking  sectors)  to  be  concentrated  in 
compact and dense geographic areas is a vital development strategy.  
However, the ways in which CBDs are developed suggest that the urban form would not serve 
strong economic hubs well. Figure 4 illustrates a new planned CBD in Zhengzhou, capital of China’s 
Henan Province. At the heart of the new CBD is a man-made water pool adjacent to a convention 
center. High-rise residential and commercial buildings are constructed around the convention center. 
Lower Residential buildings (80 meter height) are sited inner ring whereas taller commercial buildings 
(120 meter height) are in outer ring. Residential apartment with much lower density are built further out, 
separated by green space and highways or main roads.  
Unlike western cities, CBDs in China have low land use intensity manifested in low FARs and low 
building density [40]. For instance, Beijing’s CBD (located in Chaoyang district) was planned in 2001 
on an area of 3.99 square kilometers. The average building density (the ratio of land used for building 
over  total  land  in  each  lot)  is 32.81 percent and average FAR is 5.3 for seven different land uses 
(commercial,  mixed  use,  residential,  school,  cultural  and  recreational,  public  infrastructure,  and 
open/green  space).  As  expected,  land  use  intensity  varies  significantly  between  types,  as  expected. 
Commercial use has the highest FAR of 5.67, followed by mixed use with 3.95 FAR and residential use 
with 3.5 FAR. Other types have FARs that range from 0.5 to 2. The variation of building density 
between land uses is quite small. School uses have the lowest building density of 20 percent while 
cultural  and  recreational  uses  have  the  highest  value  of  40  percent.  These  general  features  of  low 
building density, high portion of green space in each lot as well as in the entire CBD areas, and presence Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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of low value added land use types such as school and public utility in Beijing’s CBD are widely shared 
by CBDs in other Chinese cities.  
Figure 4. Zhengzhou new CBD.  
 
(Source: http://news.eastday.com/eastday/node81741/node81762/node131284/userobject1ai1997583.html) 
4.3. Over Scaled Land Development  
Increasing scale renders positive social welfare as long as marginal benefits exceed marginal costs. 
Increasing rate in production costs will eventually exterminate any positive gains from increases in scale 
so that optimal operation exists for profit maximization. This general U-shape cost function is also 
applicable for land development.  
The development of University Towns is one of the most striking urban spatial developments in 
terms of scale, driven partly by rapid increases in enrollment of higher education institutes and partly by 
the national policy to promote a knowledge-based economy. By the beginning of this decade, over 50 
university  towns  have  been  developed  across  the  country.  Each  is  a  large  scale  land  development 
initiative  accommodating  multiple  universities  clustered  in  a  concentrated  geographic  region.  For 
instance, Shahe University Town in Beijing is developed to host 36 colleges and Yuelushan University 
in  Changshai  is  home  to  13  universities.  There  are 14 universities at Xiasha University Campus in 
Hangzhou.  There  are  50  university  towns  across  the  country  and  many  of  them  are  still  
under development [40].  
Issues and problems can be better illustrated through a typical examination of a University Town. 
Guangzhou, for example, created a so-called ―University Town‖ in its Panyu district in 2001. The Town, 
located about 17 kilometers away from the city center, was planned on 43.3 square kilometers of land 
with a targeted enrollment of 300,000–350,000 students [41]. Its completion involved multi-phases of 
construction. The first phrase was the construction of Xiaoguwei Island of 18 square kilometers on 
which ten different universities are housed. Constructed in a ring pattern, the heart of the campus is 
home to a centralized and shared physical recreation facility, surrounded by student dormitories along Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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the middle ring, and then by classrooms, libraries, offices and other administrative functions along the 
outermost ring (Figure 5). 
The preliminary assessment of University Towns indicates three main issues [40-41]. First, clustering 
of universities may help to build inter-university connections and intellectual resource sharing but create 
physical barriers for intra-university communication. This is because the majority of universities relocate 
some colleges and programs into newly established universities towns while their central administrative 
units  and  other  colleges  remain  on  old  campuses.  Shenzhen  University  Town  has  only  graduate 
programs  for  several  colleges  while  Zhejiang  University  has  moved  undergraduates  into  Zijingang 
University Town. There is no evidence that inter-campus collaboration has more value-added compared 
to intra-campus linkages. Therefore, opportunity costs of physical separation within universities may 
well exceed any gains from clustering different universities.  
Figure 5. Guangzhou university town. 
 
Light Blue = Institutional;      Yellow = Student Dormitory 
Bark Green = Open Space;      Brown = Recreational Facility 
A: Guangdong University of Technology  B: Southern China University of Technology 
C: Guangzhou Medical College     D: Guangzhou University of Chinese Medicine 
E: Guangdong University of Foreign Language and Trade 
F: Sun Yat-Sen University      G: Xinghai Conservatory 
H: Southern China Normal University    I: Guangzhou University 
J: Guangzhou College of Fine Art 
 
Second, the size and spatial arrangement in some cases diminishes the potential of resource sharing 
between or among universities. For instance, it is difficult, if not impossible, for students to take classes Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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at other universities in Guangzhou University Town. Since ten universities have their classrooms built 
along the outside ring in the island, the average distance between department buildings on the opposite 
side of the island is 4.5 to 5 kilometers. Unless school buses are provided, sharing classes will be a real 
issue. This creates a dilemma for school administrations. The provision of school buses will have cost 
implications while inter-university class sharing will be impossible without school buses. If students 
cannot  benefit  from  the  presence  of  other  nearby  universities,  the  rationale  for  the  clustering  
becomes questionable.  
Third, there are no documented advantages or benefits to creating a university compound that is 
home to ten universities and 200,000 to 400,000 students. Conventional wisdom is that this is too big. 
Big is not always good if returns to scale are not commensurate. Certainly there seems no economic 
justification to build a dining hall with a capacity to feed 20,000 people at the same time as is the case at 
Zhejiang University Town in Hangzhou. Trips for dinners or lunches will be less crowded and short if 
many small restaurants spread over the entire compound. The size is impressive, but the induced trips 
are unnecessary and undesirable. 
Fourth, University Towns are developed in urban fringes and in many cases in the middle of nowhere 
(for instance, in Shenzhen). Isolated and ―remote‖ locations of University Towns raise doubts on their 
spillover effects in general and impacts on knowledge based local economy in particular. Their long 
term impacts remain to be seen, but it the short term impacts appear minimal, if any.  
Finally, the clustering of universities in a spatially compact fashion also has long term consequences. 
It is anticipated that income will continue to grow along with industrialization and urbanization in China 
over the next couple of decades. The demand for higher education, therefore, will increase accordingly, 
which will inevitably require university expansion. However, each campus in a university town is so 
packed that there are few spaces left for additional construction. This implies that any expansion will 
have to take place in other sites or locations, creating multiple campuses for a university. 
4.4. Leapfrogging Development 
Urban  sprawl  in  American  cities  refers  to  low  density  and  leapfrogging  development  patterns. 
Common unwanted consequences of urban sprawl include loss of farmland, increases in transportation 
costs  and  distance,  increases  in  automobile  use  and  dependence,  increases  in  the  tax  burden  for 
provision of public services and infrastructure, worsening air and environmental quality, increases in 
energy consumption, and the development of social segregation [42].  
The density of urban development throughout Chinese cities is relatively high compared to that in US 
cities. Many new developments are constructed arbitrarily, however (Figure 6). Development sites may 
seem efficient and resourceful due to their high densities and compactness of land use attributes, but 
spatial separation from city centers and urban built-up areas does not adhere to this notion, with similar 
consequences commonly found in sprawled American cities. Assuming that only upper-middle income 
households are able to afford apartments in these compounds, spatial income segregation is and will  
be emerging. Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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Figure 6. Urban leapfrogging development. 
4.5. Whack-a-Mole Development  
The  whack-a-mole  development  pattern  primarily  takes  place  in  China’s  rural  areas,  particularly 
along  eastern  coastal  regions  (Figure  2).  Benefitting  from  opportunities  generated  by  rapid 
industrialization  and  urbanization,  rural  households  gain  substantial  income  growth  and  are  able  to 
redevelop their dwellings into modern structures on their homestead lots. Each dwelling unit is well 
structured, equipped and aesthetically pleasing. But collectively, they seem to have been constructed in 
a haphazard fashion (Figure 2). Each structure is built right in the middle of farm fields, creating a land 
development pattern that is costly in infrastructure provision and generates large negative externality. It 
will also be extremely expensive for farmland consolidation that is needed for scaled operation as well 
as infrastructure investments in agriculture. Farmland consolidation is conceivable and inevitable during 
urbanization and agricultural modernization. The former leads to the decline in rural population and 
increases average size of farming whereas the latter favors machinery uses and scale operations. Given 
the understanding that current rapid urbanization will continue into next a couple decades, some of 
these whack-a-mode developments will be engulfed into urban built-up areas. Redevelopment in these 
areas will be expensive economically, politically, and socially.  
5. How Do We Understand China’s Urban Spatial Changes and Land Development?  
5.1. Decentralization  
Fiscal  and  economic  decentralization  in  China  in  the  past few decades have become the driving 
engines  for  economic  success  because  of  their  impact  on  efficiency  of  the  public  sector  and  the Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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incentives  provided  [43-45].  The  decentralization  of  economic  development  has  transformed  local 
governments into entrepreneurs whose main task is to increase the competitive position of their cities by 
creating  favorable  institutional  and  physical  conditions  for  attracting  national  and  international 
investments as the major resource for economic development.  
A by-product of fiscal and economic decentralization is increasing economic competition amongst 
local economies that is attributed to  over-heating of the economy, causes economic instability, and 
reduces effectiveness of policy controls by the central government [44,45]. With respect to urban spatial 
development, local competition results in two kinds of issues. One is related to the mushroom-like 
booming of industrial estates. Job creation, GDP growth and fiscal tax revenues are among the most 
crucial developmental goals for local governments. They have used the creation of industrial parks and 
economic development zones as a strategy to attract businesses and investments [46].  
Figure 7. Area and revenue of public land leasing to industrial development. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
H
u
h
o
t
B
a
o
t
o
u
D
a
t
o
n
g
G
u
a
n
g
z
h
o
u
H
a
n
g
z
h
o
u
S
h
a
n
g
h
a
i
S
h
e
n
y
a
n
g
F
u
z
h
o
u
N
a
n
j
i
n
g
S
u
z
h
o
u
W
u
x
i
D
a
l
i
a
n
g
Area (%)
Revenue (%)
 
The  other  issue  is  related  to  the  ―race  to the bottom‖ behavior of local government officials in 
granting land use rights. In order to attract investments and businesses, local governments usually offer 
use rights on the state owned land for free or at much lower prices through negotiation to investors than 
actual  market  prices.  Public  land  leased  to  industrial  projects  through  negotiation  accounted  for  
75.69  percent  of  total  leased  land  and  generated  19.72  percent  of  total  land  leasing  revenues  in 
Hangzhou city in 2003 (Figure 7). Leased land through negotiation for industrial uses accounted for 
35.02 percent but rendered only 0.08 percent of land revues for Guangzhou city at the same year. This 
implies that land access to residential and commercial development through tender and open bid as 
mandated is much more expensive than industrial uses. In fact, residential and commercial land areas are 
expensive. One developer paid $20,179,133 per acre to access land use rights in 2006, which is the 
highest land price ever recorded in Hangzhou city.
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5.2. Fiscal Incentives  
The Chinese government undertook a major fiscal/tax reform in 1994, aiming at a modernization of 
the public finance system [46]. The reform, which has been considered quite successful in terms of 
meeting its targeted objectives (two objectives are to increase the ratio of tax revenues over GDP and 
to increase the ratio of tax revenues by the central government over total tax revenue), has had large 
impacts on sub-national governments whose fiscal situations were completely turned around. Before the 
reform, revenue surplus for sub-national governments was $871.42 million in 1993. Yet after the reform, 
total  fiscal  deficit  amounted  to  $24.65  billion  in  1994,  and  further  increased  to  $105.43  billion  
by 2003 [47]. 
The fiscal situation motivated local governments to begin their reliance on land revenues to finance 
urban expansion and urban infrastructure provision. The total area of leased land through the land use 
rights system was only 2,269 hectares in 1996, but increased to 62,058 hectares in 1998 and then  
to 414,782 hectares by 2003. Correspondingly, land conveyance fees increased from $4.15 billion in 
1996, to $7.14 billion in 1998, and then to $158.96 billion in 2003, respectively [47].  
From the demand perspective, the ability for local governments to raise revenues has been greatly 
enhanced by economic growth, housing privatization, and development of the real estate industry. From 
an institutional perspective, policy power in land taking and monopolized public land leasing enable 
local governments to  obtain huge profits from land  development process. The former enables local 
governments to obtain land for urban development at much lower prices and the latter makes local 
governments cash in large profits by charging developers and investors much higher costs for land. The 
price gap between land requisition compensations (prices paid to farmers) and land conveyance fees 
(prices  charged  to  developers  for  land  rights  access)  can  be  a  factor  of  several  dozens  and  land 
development becomes the source of the largest extra-budgetary revenues for local governments [48]. 
The magnitude of the importance of land revenues to local public finance is manifest in its ratio to tax 
revenues.  Land  generated  revenues  of  $154  billion  whereas  total  tax  revenues  for  all  level  of 
governments were $292 billion in 2003. After discounting tax revenue shared by the central government, 
land generated more revenues than taxes by 26 percent for sub-national governments. Figure 8 reveals 
even astonishing figures, suggesting that land revenues can be as 1–3 times as big as budgetary revenue 
incomes (The overall contribution of land revenues to a city’s fiscal aspect is less important that what 
the ratio of land revenues to tax revenues suggests because of substantial intergovernmental transfers. 
On average, 42 percent of total budgetary expenditure for sub-national governments comes from the 
central government’s transfers).  
The importance of land revenues to the local governments should be discounted since they are used 
for  land  leveling  and  on  site  infrastructure  provision  (roads,  gas  and  electricity,  water,  sewerage, 
telecommunication, and greening of urban environment etc). Even after discounting all costs, however, 
land  development  still  generates  sizable  revenues  for  local  governments.  Net  profits  from  land 
development accounted for 25 percent of total  land leasing revenues from 1992–2003 and over 60 
percent  of  total  extra  budgetary  incomes  for  sub-national  governments.  The  net  profits  from  land 
development  can  be  as  high  as  90  percent  in  cities  like  Beijing  in  2003-2004  (source: 
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2008/09-28/1398364.shtml).  
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Figure 8. Land revenue as percentage of annual local budgetary revenue. 
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As the literature suggests, extra budgetary revenues in China are more likely spent on improving 
transportation facilities, public squares and open space, rather than on education, health, and public 
safety programs [44].  Spending patterns of extra-revenues in Chinese cities are consistent with the 
literature. Land revenues in many Chinese cities are used to finance infrastructure for urban  spatial 
expansion. Three cities in Zhejiang province, Shoaxing, Jinhua, and Yiwu, surveyed by a joint project of 
the World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council in 2005, reveal that urban 
spatial expansion heavily relies upon land revenue.  About 32 percent of funds for financing urban 
expansion directly came from land revenues in Shaoxing, and figures were 51 percent and 22.3 percent 
in Jinhua and Yiwu, respectively [20]. Municipal governments also use land as collateral to access 
capital markets. In Shaoxing, the amount of land used as collateral accounted for more than 63 percent 
of total funds provided for urban expansion. Combining direct land revenues from land use rights leased 
and indirect revenues from land collateral, land is responsible for more than 95 percent of total financing 
of urban expansion in Shaoxing and 100 percent in Jinhua and Yiwu. The degree of reliance on land 
revenues for financing urban expansion raises an important question of sustainability and potential risks 
down the road as leasable state owned land is depleting (even taking land conversion into account) and 
less premium of land leasing will be generated with time. 
5.3. Developers and Individual Stockholders  
Rapid urbanization has presented unprecedented opportunities for farmers in urban fringe areas. In 
some cases, massive inflow and surge of rural migrant workers creates enormous demand for rental 
space. Rural villages adjacent to industrial parks and economic development zones and to urban-core 
areas offer locational advantages in housing these rural migrant workers. A village called Shangmeilin in 
Futian Ditrict of Shenzhen city had 241 indigent households in 2005, for example. They have built  
total 400 structures of 395,000 square meter building space that house 41,384 floating population. The 
average number of floating population (most of them are rural migrant workers) per household was 171.  Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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Seeking maximum rental returns is one of the main incentives or motivations behind the whack-a-
mole type land development. Confined geographically to their own homestead lots in many areas, rural 
households increase structure space by reconstructing taller buildings. Traditional houses in villages 
prior  to  1978  were  one  story  and  flat  in  structure.  They  were  torn  down  and  rebuilt  as  2–3  and  
then 5–10 story buildings in 1980s and 1990s, respectively. It took 20–30 years to demolish and rebuild 
houses before 1978, but declined to 4–5 years in late 1980s and further down to 2-3 years in the 1990s, 
respectively, in Shenzhen and Guangzhou [49]. 
5.4. Institutional Arrangement for Land Use and Development 
Land ownership, land conversion, and public finance 
Legal  and  institutional  arrangements  governing  land  use  and  development  may  have  significant 
spatial implications. In China, institutional arrangements that enormously affect spatial developments 
include  land  ownership,  public  land  leasing  (called  Land  Use  Rights  system),  land  requisition,  and 
farmland protection [50,51].  
Land ownership in China is distinguished by its dichotomous structure in which virtually all urban 
land  is  state owned, whereas rural farmland is collectively owned (mining and manufactory land in 
isolated sites are also state owned). A public land leasing scheme was introduced in the late 1980s to 
increase  land  use  efficiency  and  mitigate  land  use  conflicts  through pricing mechanisms. Under the 
public land leasing scheme, state owned land use rights can be separated from ownership and then be 
rented, sold, mortgaged, donated, and leased. Use rights need to be first acquired from the state by 
paying land conveyance fees to the respective local government. Land conveyance fees or lease prices 
of land use rights should be paid up front in a lump sum fashion prior to lease contact. Leasing terms 
range from 40 to 70 years, depending upon types of land uses (land use rights system and public land 
leasing is interchangeable in China; lease periods are 40, 50, and 70 years for commercial, industrial, and 
residential uses, respectively). Even though land is owned by the state, it is city or county governments 
that act as the representative of the state in managing land leasing [50,51].  
The ability of local governments to raise enormous land revenues lies in the policy power of sub-
national  governments  in  land  requisition  and  monopolizes  land  markets  of  public  land  leasing  to 
developers. The land use rights system applies only to public land, which means that rural land must be 
converted to state ownership prior to development. By exercising policy power, local governments are 
able to take land from farmers at much lower prices and sell it to developers at much higher prices in 
monopolized land markets. The price difference can be in the order of factor of several dozen [48]. In 
one village in Fujian province, for instance, the local government paid approximately $8,700 per acre to 
farmers and then resold to developers for over $650,000 per acre for commercial housing. It is hardly 
surprising to observe massive scale of land development behind of huge land revenue potentials.  
Farmland protection 
Urbanization and industrialization have caused significant depletion of farmland [52]. This prompted 
the central government to take strict measures in farmland protection to address the concern in food 
security. The most influential measures include physical designation of capital cultivated land (or basic Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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cultivated land) and 80 percent minimum requirement, which means the amount of basic cultivated land 
should account for at least 80 percent of total cultivated land in each of the provincial governments. The 
State Council’s approval is required before any basic cultivated land can be converted into urban uses. 
The Land Administration Law mandates the policy of zero-net loss in farmland (called the dynamic 
balance of farmland in China) to be implemented. It requires that one unit lost in farmland due to urban 
construction must be reclaimed somewhere else with same level of land production in agricultural yield 
(see  the  following  section  on  the  implications  of  farmland  protection  policy  on  urban  spatial 
development patterns for more details). 
Agricultural land productivity plays a predominant role in designating basic cultivated land that is 
strictly protected from development. Since most cities or a large part of the cities, if not all, are located 
at regions where land areas are not hampered by severe constraints for crop production, it is suggested 
that cities are surrounded by endowment of good farmland. As in the case in Canada, cultivated lands in 
urban fringes have higher agricultural productivities than in locations farther away from city cores [53]. 
Hence,  urban  spatial  growth  in  city  edge  implies  losses  of  quality  farmland.  Rigorous  measures  in 
farmland protection solely based on land quality will inevitably push land  development farther away 
urban cores and result in leapfrogging urban spatial development.  
The prohibition against land development on geographically designated basic cultivated land may 
render significant efficiency loss in land use and management. Sites inside basic cultivated land districts 
may have enormous economic value because of their access to transportation networks, adjacency to 
city centers, and proximity to job opportunities. Their economic values can far exceed total benefits 
from farmland protection. If so, net social welfare will be maximized by fully taking into account costs 
and  benefits  of  zoning  (such  as  agricultural)  designation  and  by  allowing  tradeoffs  of  location 
determination  for  agricultural  and  non-agricultural  activities  rather  than  simply  relying  on  land 
productivity in agriculture.  
Role of land 
The  roles  of  land  development  are  multi-faceted  in  China.  As  theory  suggests,  land  demand  is 
derived  from  urban  development  to  accommodate  needs  in housing, jobs, infrastructure, and urban 
services. Empirical studies conducted by Seto and Kaufman [25] and Deng et al. [24] conclude that the 
outcome  of  economic  growth  is  a  key  factor  in  determining  urban  spatial  structure.  Although  the 
literature treats land as a production factor in housing production function and views demand for urban 
land as a derived demand [6,7], Land plays a small role in economic or urban growth. This is mainly 
because in the standard assumption in models of urban expansion land is available in perfectly elastic 
supply  at  a  price  equal  to  (a  constant)  agricultural  rent,  so  that  land  adjusts  frictionless  to  urban 
economic and population growth driven by other factors [54].  
The  unique  combination  of  land  institutions,  land-people  tension,  uneven  distributions  of  land 
resources  and  population,  and  land  supply  for  non-agricultural  activities  suggests  that  land  can  be 
treated as a production factor for urban economic growth in China. Furthermore, the introduction of the 
land use quota virtually eliminates any possibility of incremental land conversion so that land supply is 
fixed in short run in China. Land becomes available for urban expansion only via explicit decisions of 
government officials rather than markets. Ding and Lichtenberg [54] look into the question of how Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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urban spatial expansion influences economic growth in Chinese cities. They conclude through empirical 
tests that ―the estimated value created by urban land is substantial, suggesting that land development 
constitutes an important part of the management of economic growth in major Chinese cities and thus is 
an important means through which decentralization reforms have fostered economic growth in China’s 
urban sector.‖ Duel land roles can help to explain both the incentives and motivation and then the scale 
and scope of land development across many Chinese cities.  
5.5. Fragmented Planning System 
Fragmentation  
There are three types of plans that have profound impacts on urban development in China. The first 
is  an economic development plan (Guomin Jingji He Shehui Fazhan Guihua) administrated by the 
development and reform department. The second type of plan is an urban plan administrated by the 
urban  planning  department  and  the  third  is  a  land  plan  administered  by  the  land  and  resources 
department (environmental and transportation plans are also important in shaping urban landscape. But 
these two are beyond the scope of this paper).  
Planning  was  the  central  theme  in  China’s  socialist  commanded  economy  that  managed  and 
controlled production, distribution, and consumption. The Five-Year plan (economic development plan) 
has been playing essential roles in urban economic affairs and growth. The primary objectives of an 
economic  development  plan  include  specific  growth  targets  measured  in  GDP,  industrial  outputs, 
industrial structure, employment, incomes, and investments. An economic development plan is often 
supplemented  by  concrete  capital  projects  that  range  from  infrastructure  such  as  highways,  water 
transports, airports and ports to industrial establishments (development and expansion of state owned 
enterprises). With emerging market forces, the central government has shifted towards subsidies and tax 
and fiscal policies to stimulate and manage economic growth. Municipal governments continue to rely 
on capital and infrastructure projects to achieve economic growth objectives.  
Urban  planning,  subservient  to  economic  plans,  has  been used as a technical tool to materialize 
economic  development  [55].  Core  elements  of  urban  planning  include  the  physical  layout  of 
infrastructure development, land arrangement for urban construction which includes determination of 
land demand for urban spatial expansion and physical locations, and spatial distribution of economic 
activities (urban planning, Chengshi Guihua, is a general term embracing urban master plans, detail 
plans and district plans. Detail and district plan are more design focused, under principle guidance of the 
urban master plan. In this paper, we refer urban planning to be an urban master plan).  
Land planning administrated by land and resource departments is mainly viewed as a main tool to 
implement farmland protection policies or measures. Mandated by the 1998 Land Administration Law, 
all governments above the county level should develop a land plan (it would be called land use plan if 
direct translated into English, but the contents and meanings of such words are very different from what 
it implies in the US; to make a distinction, the term ―land plan‖ is used in reference to China). the 
primary objectives of a land plan include: 1) to strictly protect basic farmland and control the amount of 
agricultural land for construction; 2) to improve land use efficiency; 3) to coordinate and balance land 
uses across regions; 4) to protect ecological and environmental systems and pursue the sustainable use Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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of land; and 5) to maintain a balance of urban use and land reclamation). The means to achieve the 
objectives of farmland protection include 1) the requirement of a minimum share of protected farmland; 
2) the designation of basic farmland districts; 3) a mandatory requirement of a zero-net loss in farmland; 
4) approval by the State Council on land conversion of basic farmland; and 5) a top-down allocation of 
land use quotas. Land use quotas include the total amount for urban construction, the total amount for 
urban construction within cities and townships, the total amount for urban construction on farmland, the 
total  amount  for  urban  construction  on  capital  farmland,  as  well  as  the  total  amount  of  protected 
farmland and capital farmland. The Land Administration Law requires that land plan at a lower level of 
government should be drawn up on the basis of a plan developed at a higher level of government in 
China’s hierarchical administration system (Article 18, the Land Administration Law). Vertical controls 
and management in land plan is much stronger than urban plan.  
Issues and problems  
A fragmented planning institution system has been blamed as least partially for ill-developed urban 
spatial patterns in China [56]. The fragmentation of plans is reflected in three important aspects. First, 
there is disintegration in contents. An economic development plan deals with capital projects without 
any  consideration  of  site  or  location  selection,  whereas  an  urban  plan  determines  zoning  and 
infrastructure provision without any consideration, implicitly or explicitly, of costs or benefits of land 
use and pricing of land. Specifically, urban planning is focused on laying out a perfect end-state for a 
city and there has been little concern over the practical integration of services through budgeting, land 
markets and management, or for the cost and affordability of the expected end-state. Little attention has 
also been paid to the issues of economic efficiency or social equity. Therefore, the dominance of an 
economic development plan can lead to stochastic location selections for capital projects. A land plan 
prioritizes farmland protection based solely on the land’s physical quality without any consideration to 
the potential economic values of sites for non-agricultural uses.  
The  second  aspect  is  associated  with  internal  conflicts  rising  from  the  mismatch  between 
development and approval of plans. An economic development plan is drafted by the development and 
reform department (or commission) on behalf of the government (each level of government—national, 
provincial, local, and international—has its own plan) and should be approved by the entire body of the 
people’s  congress  that  convenes  every  five  years  at  the  same  level  (the  county  people’s  congress 
approves  the  county’s  plan,  the  city  people’s  congress  approves  the  city’s  plan,  and  so  on).  Like 
economic  development  plan,  both  the  land  plan  and  the  urban  plan  are  drafted  by  governments’ 
administrative braches (land and resources department and urban planning department, respectively) in 
each of four levels of governments. Unlike the economic development plan, both the land plan and the 
urban plan need different government levels for plan approvals. An urban plan (master plan) should be 
approved by the State Council for provincial capital cities including the four municipalities (Beijing, 
Shanghai,  Tianjin,  and  Chongqing)  directly  under  the  Central  Government  or  by  the  provincial 
government  for  other  cities.  A  land  plan  is  distinguished  by  its  strong  hierarchical  structure  of 
administration and approval procedures, reflected in the top-down allocation and determination of land 
use quotas. The State Council approves land plans for cities with a population over one million over Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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while provincial governments approve land plans for countries, and cities with a population of less than 
one million.  
The third and final aspect exposes the mismatches between the time goals of each of the three plans. 
The Five-Year Plan, has a five year planning period whereas the planning horizons for urban plans 
(urban master plan) and land plans (land master plan) are set at 20 years and 15 years, respectively. To 
make matters worse, the inception date of each of the three plans are usually different.  
It is assumed that plans with long planning horizons should govern plans of short planning horizons 
for  effective  implementation.  That  is  not  the  case  in  China.  The  five-year  economic  plan  at  all 
government levels above (including) counties is mandated by the Constitution while both urban plan and 
land plan are institutionalized by the Urban-Rural Planning Law and the Land Administration Law, 
respectively. The five-year economic plan, hence, has a much higher legislative status than other two 
plans. Both the Urban-Rural Planning Law and the Land Administration Law require that the urban plan 
and the land plan be drafted and developed under the requirements of five-year economic plans. This 
raises a fundamental question that is how to draw out a longer term plan (15–20 years) on the basis of a 
five-year plan while maintaining its efficiency and directory. This seems to be a task or a challenge void 
of any feasible solutions.  
The fragmentation in planning systems (mismatch in three plans) becomes increasingly problematic in 
cities and counties mainly because location implications of plans are much stronger downward along the 
administrative ladder. City development requires mobilization of three key factors of labor, capital, and 
land for accommodating growth and development. Given approval requirements, city governments have 
less freedom in mobilizing land resources. The restriction of land resource mobility, which is needed to 
increase economic efficiency and to deal with future uncertainty in growth, results in inflexible zoning 
and land supply. This makes frequent revisions in urban plans inevitable to accommodate economic 
growth. Both lack of mobility and absence of pricing considerations result in efficient loss in urban 
spatial development.  
The  fragmentation  of  the  three  plans  and  the  top-down  control  on  land  development  has  three 
unwanted consequences. First, it is associated with the behavior change of local officials. The top-down 
land quota allocation and tough approval procedures encourage city officials to request as much land 
area as possible and then worry less about land use efficiency and actual demand for development while 
the revenue incentive of land development encourages city officials to lease out as much land area as 
they can. The second consequence is a manifest in frequent revision of the urban plan.
 This is partly 
because more land is needed to achieve ambitious growth objectives and partly because urban plan 
revision is used as a technical tool for city governments to maneuver and circumvent strict land use 
controls. The third and final consequence is lack of a long term development vision and the systematic 
consideration in zoning and site determination for urban activities, which then leads to chaotic and 
stochastic development patterns.  
Ill-designed planning regulations  
There  are  several  cases  in  which  good  intentions  in  planning  and  policy  orientations  generate 
unwanted outcomes. First of all, urban design has been a core element in urban plan practice, which 
stresses the improvement of urban living environments by implementing a minimum requirement of open Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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and  green  space  and  strict  control  of  FARs.  Open/green  space  usually  takes  30-35  percent  of 
development lots (Figure 3) while the value of FAR is set to 1–2 for most residential development.  
Secondly, open areas and green space are necessities for the quality of urban life. They provide 
amenities that are well capitalized into housing and land values and important to many urban activities 
such as educational institutions, health facilities, and residential enclaves, to name few. Greenbelts built 
to spatially separate manufacturing firms that discharge pollutants into the air and water can help to 
minimize environment impacts on urban residents. But green space separating commercial buildings in a 
CBD (Figure 2) adds little value to city competitiveness. It can make built-up urban landscape look 
beautiful and nice, but may impose huge direct and indirect costs on urban infrastructure, transportation, 
and agglomerative economy. These negative effects can outweigh any potential gains from ostensible 
beautification that does demand non-trivial maintenance inputs.  
6. Final Remarks  
Urban spatial development patterns have drawn a lot of attention because they directly influence 
travel demand and behavior, which are linked to climate change and energy consumption. A series of 
efforts  in  some  American  cities have been initiated to reduce auto-dependency and vehicle mileage 
traveled  (VMT) through pricing policy (such as highway pricing) and smart growth that advocates 
mixed  uses,  compacted  and  dense  developments,  transit  oriented  development,  and  corridor 
development [42,54,55]. 
Although Chinese cities have different cultures, histories, and institutional arrangements governing 
land  use  and  development,  the  principles  of  efficient  urban  spatial  development are still applicable. 
Efficiency of urban spatial structure should be measured and gauged from the prospective of urban 
agglomeration, transportation implication, allocation of resources (land and capital), and environmental 
and social impacts. This paper reveals that there are prevailing development patterns that are inefficient 
in  the  rapid  urbanization  and  industrialization  in  past  decades  and  concludes  that  these  inefficient 
patterns are directly or indirectly resulted from: 1) mal-functioning of planning institutions; 2) local 
competition and economic growth focused or oriented behavior of local government officials; 3) strong 
incentives behind land development and role of land in promoting city economic growth; 4) single-
minded  farmland  protection;  5)  single-minded  urban  planning  practice;  and  6)  individual  actions  of 
stockholders for maximum rent seeking.  
It is anticipated that China will experience rapid urbanization far into the 21
st century, which will 
merge the two developing frontiers—rural and urban areas—more closely together and will result in a 
series  of  policy  challenges  in  terms  of  employment  pressure,  housing  sheltering  for  low  income 
households, farmland preservation, environment protection, just name a few. China has demonstrated 
great abilities in promoting growth in past decades. It is hopeful that the Chinese governments take 
appropriate actions and measures to promote efficient spatial patterns for sustainable urban growth. 
More  research  on  measuring  urban  development  patterns  and  quantifying  efficient  losses  is  greatly 
needed in the future.  Sustainability 2009, 1                      
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